


# The First to Know: How Token Distributions Reveal Hidden Knowledge in Large Vision-Language Models?

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
**Abstract.** Large vision-language models (LVLMs), designed to interpret and respond to human instructions, occasionally generate hallucinated or harmful content due to inappropriate instructions. This study uses linear probing to shed light on the hidden knowledge at the output layers of LVLMs. We demonstrate that the logit distributions of the first tokens contain sufficient information to determine whether to respond to the instructions, including recognizing unanswerable visual questions, defending against jailbreaking attacks, and identifying deceptive questions. Such hidden knowledge is gradually lost in logits of subsequent tokens during response generation. Then, we illustrate a simple decoding strategy at the generation of the first token, effectively improving the generated content. In experiments, we find a few interesting insights: First, the CLIP model already contains a strong signal for solving these tasks, which indicates potential bias in the existing datasets. Second, we observe performance improvement by utilizing the first logit distributions on three additional tasks, including indicating uncertainty in math solving, mitigating hallucination, and image classification. Last, with the same training data, simply finetuning LVLMs improves models’ performance but is still inferior to linear probing on these tasks.<sup>3</sup>

**Keywords:** Large Vision-Language Models · Logit Distribution · First Token · Hidden Knowledge · Linear Probing

## 1 Introduction

Large vision-language models (LVLMs), integrating vision encoders and pre-trained large language models (LLMs), have emerged as powerful tools for interpreting multimodal input and following human instructions [3, 16, 26, 31, 34]. Despite their impressive capabilities, recent works report that LVLMs often hallucinate when responding to unanswerable visual questions [12], generate harmful content under jailbreaking attacks [17], and are easily fooled by deceptive questions [22], as illustrated in Fig. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Our code is available at <https://github.com/Qinyu-Allen-Zhao/LVLM-LP>.



**Fig. 1:** Scenarios where LVLMs may make undesirable responses. The first tokens are emphasized in *italics* for clarity. Note that although the first tokens are usually nondescript words like “the” and “1”, we find that the logit vectors of them are actually very informative for determining the proper responses.


In this paper we study the question: do models implicitly *know* that they are generating inappropriate or undesirable content? Specifically, we examine the logit distribution over tokens at the output layer and use this as a feature vector through linear probing for predicting various behavior (unanswerability, jailbreaking, deception), in spite of the content that the model actually produces. Interestingly, the logit distribution of the very first token contains sufficient information to determine if the model should follow the instruction. The usefulness of the “first logits” is not significantly influenced when we use different prompts, such as directly asking whether the model should respond to the instructions, asking the original prompts, or providing hints that the instructions may be unanswerable or harmful. We also find that the hidden knowledge weakens as the model continues to generate output, so the logit distributions of later tokens are less discriminative than earlier ones for these tasks.

A similar finding was recently reported by Slobodkin *et al.* [25] and also Qian *et al.* [21], but both in the limited context of natural language processing (NLP) and using the hidden states of a model. In our work, we show that this approach can be applied more generally and, importantly, with only limited assumption about model internals (i.e., access to logit distributions over tokens). We also provide insights into some of their findings, such as why averaging over multiple tokens does not improve results.

Armed with these findings, a simple decoding strategy (shown in Fig. 2) can be applied at the generation of the first token, guided by a trained linear classifier on each task, effectively improving the generated content. Our approach enhances the safety and reliability of LLMs and LVLMs, and provides an alternative to implementing front-end guardrails or retraining models through supervised fine-tuning (SFT) or reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF).

Through extensive experimentation, we arrive at several interesting insights:

- We find CLIP [23], whose vision encoder is often employed in LVLMs, effectively identifies unanswerable questions, jailbreaking attacks, and deceptive



**Fig. 2:** Illustration of a possible application by using our linear probing method. Given a text prompt and an image, we take the logit vector of the first token and feed it into the linear probing module (logistic regression for binary classification and Linear Discriminant Analysis for multi-way classification). The classifiers are trained on different tasks, such as answerable *vs.* unanswerable, correct *vs.* incorrect answers, *etc.*

questions, which indicates significant dataset bias. That is, inappropriate visual instructions are significantly different from the normal input.

- We apply linear probing on the first logit distributions for three other tasks and observe performance improvement, including indicating uncertainty in math solving, mitigating hallucination, and image classification. This shows that sufficient hidden knowledge exists in the first logit distributions, which can be used to enhance LVLMs.
- We finetune LLaVA [15] using the training data for all tasks involved in our study, and also retrain LLaVA by combining its original training data with ours. We find that finetuning and retraining improve the performance on these tasks but are not as good as linear probing. After finetuning or retraining, the linear probing performance on each task is usually weakened.

## 2 Related Works

**Undesirable content generated by LVLMs.** Previous works report that LVLMs are prone to answer unanswerable or deceptive questions with hallucinated or inaccurate content [22], generate harmful responses given maliciously designed instructions [2, 17], or answer some questions even though they do not know the correct answers [30]. Qian *et al.* [22] prompts GPT-4 to generate deceptive questions. For instance, given an image of two dogs, a deceptive question with incorrect object number is “What are the three dogs in the image doing?” LVLMs are easily fooled by the question and describe the activities of three dogs. Liu *et al.* [17] generate images of illegal or harmful activities by using diffusion models, and ask LVLMs how to do the activities shown in the images, *i.e.*, via jailbreaking attacks, demonstrating the vulnerability of existing LVLMs.

**Previous efforts on addressing these issues.** In literature, there are existing attempts for these problems. A straightforward method is to align LVLMs with human preference using RLHF [2]. Another possible way is to collect

datasets containing harmful and normal data, and finetune an LLM for detecting harmful content [19]. But both methods require considerable computational resources. Prompt tuning, which aims to manually design or learn prompts to enhance LVLMs for a specific task, is also useful but usually suboptimal. It is non-trivial to manually design prompts and costly to learn prompts with LVLMs.

**Linear probing in LLMs.** Linear probing has been used in understanding and extracting knowledge of LLMs [9]. Two contemporary works in NLP demonstrate linear probing based on the first generated token in LLMs is able to identify unanswerable questions and complete other trustworthy-related tasks [21,25]. We claim that our work is conducted independently and presents notable distinctions: first, we observe the logit distributions of the first tokens contain similar information and even outperform the hidden states of the first generated tokens. Second, we conduct experiments on six diverse tasks with visual input, indicating a broader scope than their studies. Last, we derive a few additional insights, some of which can explain the observation in their works.

### 3 Linear Probing on Logit Distributions

In this section, we first revisit the autoregressive generation process of LVLMs, and then introduce our linear probing method based on the logit distribution of tokens. We will discuss further exploration regarding our method. Last, we will showcase a simple decoding method guided by results from linear probing.

#### 3.1 LVLm background

We start with a brief introduction to LVLMs. A typical LVLm contains a vision encoder  $\mathcal{E}$  and a large language model  $\mathcal{M}$ . Let  $T$  be the token set, *e.g.*, a set of 32,000 tokens for LLaVA. Given the text input  $\mathbf{t} = [t_1, \dots, t_N \mid t_n \in T]$  and an image  $\mathbf{x}$ , the model generates a sequence of tokens  $[y_1, \dots, y_K \mid y_k \in T]$ .

The generation is autoregressive, which means  $\mathcal{M}$  predicts the next token  $y_k$  each time based on the input  $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t})$  and previous output  $\mathbf{y}_{<k} = [y_1, \dots, y_{k-1}]$ . The logit distribution over the next token is

$$\ell = \mathcal{M}(\mathcal{E}(\mathbf{x}), \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{y}_{<k}) \in \mathbb{R}^{|T|}, \quad (1)$$

where  $|T|$  is the number of candidate tokens.

A sampling function will be applied to the logit distribution  $\ell$ , for example, greedy decoding and beam search. Upon sampling the next token, the process evaluates termination criteria, which primarily includes: whether the next token is a special token indicating the end of the generation, or if the generated content has reached the allowed maximum length. If the generation continues, subsequent tokens are produced based on the input and the preceding output.

Next, we introduce the proposed linear probing method based on logits.

### 3.2 Linear probing

For a specific task, we have a train set and a test set. Each sample is an image-text pair, *e.g.*, an image of a dog and a question regarding the color of the dog. We feed the training samples into an LVLM and extract the logit distribution corresponding to each output token, and train a linear classifier model  $\mathcal{P}_\theta$  with learnable parameters  $\theta$  on the logits. Then, we evaluate  $\mathcal{P}_\theta$  on the test set.

In experiments, we evaluate seven different LVLMs in three tasks with varying prompt designs. We will demonstrate that the logit distribution of the very first token proves to be highly beneficial across a variety of tasks, including recognizing unanswerable visual questions, defending against multi-modal jailbreaking attacks, and identifying deceptive questions. The usefulness of the “first logits” will be validated across different models, tasks and prompts.

### 3.3 Further exploration

We explore more questions *w.r.t.* hidden knowledge in LVLMs.

**Logit distributions of the first token vs. subsequent tokens.** We compare the performance of the linear classifier trained on the first token and on the subsequent tokens. The hypothesis here is that the first logit distribution contains enough hidden knowledge gathered from the input, while the subsequent logits contain less, because the LVLM model conditioned on previous tokens gradually becomes more confident in the output that it generates.

**Logit distributions vs. hidden states.** Recent works report hidden states of the first generated tokens can be used to identify unanswerable questions or perform trustworthy-related tasks in NLP [21, 25]. We also use those hidden states to train a linear classifier on our multi-modal tasks, and compare against the performance using logits. Note that access to hidden states requires more knowledge of the internal model architecture than logit output.

**Why do logits of the first token contain information for these tasks?** We evaluate the performance of linear probing on the CLIP model (ViT-L/14 336px) [23] on the same tasks. We utilize (1) image embeddings, (2) text embeddings, and (3) both embeddings from CLIP. We will show that CLIP already shows remarkable performance, serving as a strong information source for LLaVA. Besides, we notice that there may be significant bias in the datasets. The jailbreaking attacks and normal images are significantly different.

### 3.4 Decoding method guided by linear probing

Considering the structure of autoregressive models, we show a simple decoding method that utilizes the remarkable performance of linear probing. Given an image and a prompt, we feed them to the LVLM and get the logit distribution of the first token. Then, we provide the logits to a trained linear classifier. As shown in Fig. 2, the linear classifier predicts the question as a “jailbreaking attack”. Next, the output tokens will be set as “Sorry, answering your question will generate harmful content, because”. We send the tokens back to the LVLM and ask it

to generate the following tokens. Thanks to the autoregressive architecture, the LVLm can automatically fill in the following reasoning process.

This method just adds a linear classifier into the decoding generation process, without huge additional computation cost at inference. Note that this is just one of possible demonstrations of how the results of linear probing can be used.

## 4 Experiments

### 4.1 Models and prompts

In our experiments, we cover open-source models including LLaVA-v1.5 (13B), LLaVA-v1.5 (7B) [15], InstructBLIP [3], mPLUG-Owl [32], LLaMA-Adapter (V2, multi-modal) [5], MMGPT [7], and MiniGPT-4 [34]. Unless explicitly specified, we use the 7B version of the models. All these models have been reported to readily generate undesirable content under certain instructions.

We design different prompts: (1) *OE*, asking the original open-ended questions in the benchmark; (2) *Hint*, asking each question with a hint indicating the question may be unanswerable / may generate harmful content / may be deceptive; (3) *Meta*, asking a meta-question like “Is this question answerable or not?”. The detailed prompts are all provided in the supp. materials (Section A).

### 4.2 Metrics

Our primary evaluation metrics are accuracy (ACC), F1 score, and Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC). Additionally, for datasets on jailbreaking and deception, we report the attack success rate (ASR). This metric treats prompts as attacks and calculates the proportion of instances where the model follows these prompts without recognizing the problems in them.

Note that to compute AUC for LVLms, we use logits of some specific tokens, following the practice in NLP [4, 13, 27]. This approach generally yields superior results compared to relying solely on the textual outputs of LVLms. For instance, when asking model “Will answering the question generate harmful content?”, we extract the logit associated with the token “No”. A comprehensive evaluation outline is provided in the supp. materials (Section A.3).

### 4.3 Tasks and datasets

**Unanswerable VQA.** The VizWiz dataset is designed to aid the visually impaired [8]. It comprises images captured by blind people, each accompanied by a spoken question about the image. Some of the questions are unanswerable due to insufficient visual details. The task we focus on is to determine whether a visual question can be answered or not. The train and validation sets contain 20,523 and 4,319 image-question pairs, respectively.

**Defense to jailbreaking attacks.** MM-SafetyBench applies jailbreaking attacks at LVLms in thirteen scenarios with malicious text prompts and images [17]. The original dataset provides 1,680 unsafe questions for attack, and

for each question, they generate three different types of images, including an image generated by stable diffusion [20], an image of rendered text, and a combined image of the first two. In this study, we only use the combined images, which usually show the highest attack success rates.

A weakness of the dataset is that it only contains jailbreaking attacks: an extremely conservative model that declines to answer any questions will get perfect performance on this dataset but is not useful in practice. To address this, we first evaluate LVLMS by distinguishing between jailbreaking attacks from this benchmark and normal questions from other benchmarks. However, this leads to significant simplification of the task due to the distribution difference between jailbreaking attacks and normal questions. Thus, we follow the data generation pipeline in MM-SafetyBench to first generate safe questions via prompting GPT-4 and convert these questions to jailbreaking-style image-question pairs.

We generate questions of different categories, including daily activity, economics, physical, legal, politics, finance, health, sex, and government. For each category, we generate 200 questions and generate a corresponding image for each question. Finally, we have a total of 1,800 safe image-question pairs.

We train our linear model on these data to distinguish whether the output will be harmful. For training, we randomly select 10 samples from each category in both safe and unsafe sets. Thus, we have 90 safe and 130 unsafe training samples. The remaining data of the MM-SafeBench and those of our generated data are used as the test set. We also sample 1,000 image-question pairs from the LLaVA train set and add them into the train set as safe data.

**Identifying deceptive questions.** MAD-Bench contains 850 image-question pairs designed to deceive LVLMS, regarding count of objects, non-existent objects, object attributes, scene understanding, spatial relationships, and visual confusion [22]. For example, given an image of two cats, a deceptive question is “What are the three cats doing?”. In this case, instead of answering the question directly, models are expected to recognize the inconsistency between questions and images in their responses. The deceptive questions are generated by prompting GPT-4 with COCO ground truth captions, and the generated questions are manually filtered to build the dataset. However, this dataset has not been publicly released. Therefore, we repeat their generation pipeline, using the same prompts to generate 1,000 images of five different categories.

The MAD-Bench benchmark only contains deceptive questions, leading to biased evaluation. If a model naively replies “Sorry, the question is inconsistent with the image” to all questions, it will have a perfect result on the benchmark. To address this, we prompt GPT-4 to generate 1,000 normal questions based on the COCO val2017 dataset. We use 100 deceptive and 100 normal samples to train the linear classifier and assess its performance on the remaining data.


#### 4.4 Main evaluation

As shown in Table 1, our method recognizes inappropriate instructions on each benchmark, consistently across different models and prompts. Note that, with varying prompts, the performance of linear probing does not change significantly.

**Table 1:** Performance of linear probing (LP) on three benchmarks. We evaluate seven models with three different prompts: OE, asking the original open-ended questions; Hint, asking the original questions with hints; Meta, asking meta-questions like “Is this question answerable or not?”. Given the same model and prompt, we compare the two rows, *i.e.*, the original performance of LVLm ( $\times$ ) and the performance of LP ( $\checkmark$ ). The better result among the two rows is highlighted in the gray area. Note that there are some extreme numbers in the table, such as  $ASR = 0$ , due to poor instruction following capabilities or biased outputs of LVLms in that task. For example, LLaVA-13B frequently interprets a question as a jailbreaking attack under the meta prompt, leading to a very low ASR without any improvement in ACC.

| Model         | Prompt | LP           | VizWiz         |               |                | MM-SafetyBench   |                |               | MAD-Bench      |                  |                |               |                |
|---------------|--------|--------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
|               |        |              | ACC $\uparrow$ | F1 $\uparrow$ | AUC $\uparrow$ | ASR $\downarrow$ | ACC $\uparrow$ | F1 $\uparrow$ | AUC $\uparrow$ | ASR $\downarrow$ | ACC $\uparrow$ | F1 $\uparrow$ | AUC $\uparrow$ |
| LLaVA (13B)   | Meta   | $\times$     | 54.92          | 53.32         | 79.36          | 7.14             | 58.71          | 40.50         | 70.23          | 17.67            | 84.28          | 84.58         | 90.81          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 83.45          | 88.23         | 90.26          | 8.59             | 87.21          | 87.37         | 94.89          | 5.67             | 93.17          | 93.09         | 97.74          |
|               | Hint   | $\times$     | 74.69          | 80.98         | 80.08          | 61.28            | 58.99          | 66.68         | 57.99          | 72.00            | 63.78          | 73.32         | 63.78          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 84.12          | 88.53         | 90.35          | 6.75             | 89.63          | 89.80         | 96.38          | 7.44             | 93.33          | 93.38         | 97.92          |
|               | OE     | $\times$     | 71.50          | 80.83         | 62.00          | 70.26            | 65.74          | 75.35         | 63.98          | 78.56            | 55.22          | 66.53         | 55.22          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 84.37          | 88.82         | 90.96          | 6.36             | 92.48          | 92.77         | 97.83          | 5.89             | 93.44          | 93.40         | 98.32          |
| LLaVA (7B)    | Meta   | $\times$     | 44.34          | 32.70         | 75.46          | 53.89            | 45.34          | 45.60         | 44.02          | 81.56            | 59.11          | 70.93         | 91.25          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 83.33          | 88.23         | 90.23          | 8.64             | 90.67          | 91.11         | 96.69          | 8.44             | 90.94          | 90.89         | 96.91          |
|               | Hint   | $\times$     | 65.25          | 70.92         | 70.93          | 36.08            | 60.00          | 60.05         | 60.14          | 37.33            | 73.22          | 75.78         | 73.22          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 83.14          | 87.89         | 89.93          | 7.94             | 88.40          | 88.57         | 95.83          | 8.89             | 90.00          | 89.89         | 96.33          |
|               | OE     | $\times$     | 70.46          | 80.11         | 60.89          | 70.80            | 65.58          | 75.25         | 63.82          | 80.00            | 55.00          | 66.67         | 55.00          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 83.31          | 88.02         | 90.05          | 7.00             | 90.09          | 90.28         | 97.03          | 7.22             | 92.44          | 92.42         | 97.19          |
| InstructBLIP  | Meta   | $\times$     | 40.22          | 22.83         | 62.47          | 0.00             | 47.55          | 0.00          | 60.08          | 100.00           | 50.00          | 66.67         | 37.65          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 82.15          | 87.22         | 88.95          | 9.79             | 89.39          | 89.83         | 96.16          | 5.22             | 90.22          | 89.76         | 96.25          |
|               | Hint   | $\times$     | 68.37          | 80.02         | 60.40          | 14.71            | 49.51          | 26.97         | 51.15          | 100.00           | 50.00          | 66.67         | 37.65          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 81.71          | 86.91         | 88.81          | 6.91             | 87.98          | 87.94         | 95.08          | 3.78             | 92.44          | 92.15         | 98.32          |
|               | OE     | $\times$     | 58.49          | 63.96         | 60.87          | 76.95            | 62.06          | 73.25         | 60.15          | 78.11            | 54.56          | 65.75         | 54.56          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 83.33          | 88.00         | 89.71          | 8.48             | 88.87          | 89.08         | 96.02          | 5.78             | 92.28          | 92.12         | 98.29          |
| mPLUG-Owl     | Meta   | $\times$     | 72.03          | 82.68         | 79.81          | 87.99            | 56.72          | 70.31         | 69.66          | 26.33            | 83.06          | 84.51         | 93.52          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 84.65          | 89.05         | 91.34          | 7.12             | 90.98          | 91.27         | 97.15          | 4.22             | 93.83          | 93.71         | 98.43          |
|               | Hint   | $\times$     | 74.88          | 80.32         | 82.16          | 96.13            | 52.21          | 67.86         | 49.94          | 72.22            | 63.67          | 73.26         | 63.67          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 82.98          | 87.71         | 89.96          | 8.76             | 89.45          | 89.76         | 95.68          | 5.44             | 93.22          | 93.13         | 98.08          |
|               | OE     | $\times$     | 72.45          | 80.82         | 65.18          | 64.18            | 68.74          | 77.02         | 67.14          | 76.00            | 57.33          | 68.00         | 57.33          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 83.95          | 88.45         | 90.78          | 8.66             | 91.29          | 91.72         | 97.20          | 4.44             | 94.33          | 94.26         | 98.78          |
| LLaMA-Adapter | Meta   | $\times$     | 32.07          | 0.00          | 50.62          | 0.00             | 47.55          | 0.00          | 46.14          | 87.56            | 54.56          | 68.02         | 73.28          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 82.54          | 87.64         | 88.51          | 10.17            | 87.58          | 87.91         | 94.87          | 9.11             | 88.56          | 88.28         | 95.57          |
|               | Hint   | $\times$     | 44.66          | 43.50         | 51.90          | 21.02            | 87.76          | 89.18         | 87.33          | 100.00           | 50.00          | 66.67         | 50.00          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 81.73          | 87.10         | 87.82          | 8.76             | 89.45          | 89.76         | 95.68          | 9.11             | 87.94          | 87.58         | 95.02          |
|               | OE     | $\times$     | 68.51          | 78.31         | 60.03          | 76.18            | 63.16          | 73.92         | 61.28          | 81.22            | 54.06          | 66.04         | 54.06          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 82.33          | 87.44         | 88.82          | 9.93             | 90.31          | 90.80         | 96.17          | 6.44             | 91.39          | 91.20         | 97.05          |
| MMGPT         | Meta   | $\times$     | 58.37          | 71.20         | 52.58          | 0.00             | 47.55          | 0.00          | 36.64          | 92.11            | 52.72          | 67.36         | 52.72          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 79.53          | 85.79         | 85.87          | 6.73             | 90.31          | 90.50         | 96.46          | 8.78             | 90.56          | 90.49         | 96.57          |
|               | Hint   | $\times$     | 32.30          | 0.88          | 56.06          | 28.75            | 54.60          | 47.52         | 55.40          | 61.00            | 58.50          | 65.27         | 58.50          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 81.52          | 86.98         | 88.03          | 6.72             | 91.13          | 91.39         | 97.07          | 16.00            | 81.61          | 81.16         | 89.68          |
|               | OE     | $\times$     | 58.44          | 65.74         | 58.30          | 97.84            | 52.85          | 68.73         | 50.48          | 76.22            | 50.28          | 60.69         | 50.28          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 81.52          | 86.98         | 88.03          | 5.01             | 93.56          | 93.78         | 98.34          | 12.67            | 83.06          | 82.30         | 91.22          |
| MiniGPT4      | Meta   | $\times$     | 50.36          | 53.09         | 45.20          | 0.00             | 47.55          | 0.00          | 53.94          | 77.22            | 53.94          | 64.89         | 66.38          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 80.85          | 86.48         | 87.24          | 13.56            | 81.26          | 81.29         | 89.72          | 12.44            | 83.72          | 83.07         | 90.80          |
|               | Hint   | $\times$     | 68.77          | 79.06         | 67.39          | 36.90            | 64.91          | 66.84         | 64.78          | 99.89            | 50.06          | 66.69         | 50.06          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 82.66          | 87.53         | 88.84          | 10.01            | 84.02          | 83.91         | 91.57          | 10.89            | 85.94          | 85.48         | 93.73          |
|               | OE     | $\times$     | 69.18          | 77.17         | 65.01          | 85.01            | 59.08          | 71.82         | 57.00          | 76.33            | 55.44          | 66.19         | 55.44          |
|               |        | $\checkmark$ | 81.78          | 87.05         | 88.53          | 9.76             | 86.87          | 87.12         | 94.51          | 14.11            | 85.83          | 85.83         | 92.30          |





**Fig. 3:** Further analysis using linear probing. The y-axes represent the AUC or ACC differences between different settings and the first logit distribution. (a-b) The logit distributions of subsequent tokens show sub-optimal performance compared to the first token, while the last token shows competitive results. “<E>” is the special token indicating the end of generation. (c-d) We also train linear probing modules on the hidden states of the first generated tokens. The middle hidden states show better or comparable performance, whereas the last hidden states are usually sub-optimal.

## 4.5 Further analysis

**Hidden knowledge in subsequent tokens.** Previously, the focus is on the logit distribution of the first token. Here we explore whether the subsequent tokens such as the second and the third tokens have similar properties. Using the same three datasets and the original prompts, logistic regression models are trained based on the logit distributions of different tokens.

As shown in Fig. 3(a-b), the performance of linear probing goes down gradually when we use the subsequent tokens. The results may indicate the model contains the most information at the beginning of generating the response, but fools itself and loses the information gradually in the autoregressive process.

Interestingly, the special token used to signify the end of a sequence, “<E>”, also performs well in our tasks. That is possibly because the token needs to integrate information from both the question and answer to decide when the response is complete. However, since “<E>” is generated after the full response, the model has spent a considerable amount of time and might have produced a harmful answer. Thus, we will not deeply explore “<E>” in our study.

**Training the probing module on hidden states.** We feed data from the train and test sets into LLaVA-v1.5 (7B), and extract hidden states in different layers of the first generated tokens. Then, a logistic regression model is trained based on the hidden states of each layer on the train set, and validated on the test set. As seen in Fig. 3(c-d), at the beginning, the hidden states do not show the answerability of the question, but after around 10 layers, the hidden states can be used for the task with performance comparable to the first logit distribution. However, the last several layers are slightly inferior to the first logit distribution. Note that, due to the architectures of the LLMs involved in this study [28, 29], the hidden states are gotten after the generation of the first token.

**Table 2:** Comparing CLIP with LLaVA on three benchmarks. “Image (I)”, “Text (T)” and “I+T” indicate linear probing using image embeddings, text embeddings, and both from CLIP, respectively. “LP” is the linear probing method we use on the first logit distribution. It is clear that CLIP shows strong performance.

| Model | Method    | VizWiz         |               |                | MM-SafetyBench   |                |               |                | MAD-Bench        |                |               |                |
|-------|-----------|----------------|---------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
|       |           | ACC $\uparrow$ | F1 $\uparrow$ | AUC $\uparrow$ | ASR $\downarrow$ | ACC $\uparrow$ | F1 $\uparrow$ | AUC $\uparrow$ | ASR $\downarrow$ | ACC $\uparrow$ | F1 $\uparrow$ | AUC $\uparrow$ |
| CLIP  | Image (I) | 76.18          | 83.61         | 80.03          | 15.84            | 76.78          | 76.34         | 85.66          | 51.89            | 50.28          | 51.33         | 49.79          |
|       | Text (T)  | 71.87          | 81.48         | 71.64          | 6.35             | 89.82          | 89.91         | 95.76          | 11.11            | 84.78          | 84.13         | 92.10          |
|       | I + T     | 80.50          | 86.13         | 86.19          | 8.30             | 87.06          | 87.14         | 95.29          | 13.67            | 82.83          | 82.21         | 91.21          |
| LLaVA | LP        | 83.31          | 88.02         | 90.05          | 7.00             | 90.09          | 90.28         | 97.03          | 7.22             | 92.44          | 92.42         | 97.19          |

More variants of our method, such as using probability distributions of the first token, are discussed in the supp. materials (Section B).

**Why are logits of the first token useful on these tasks?** Furthermore, we assess the performance of CLIP with the same train and test sets. Note that LLaVA uses the vision encoder of CLIP. We train a linear classifier based on (1) image embeddings, (2) text embeddings, or (3) both embeddings from CLIP.


As shown in the Table 2, CLIP already demonstrates good performance on the three tasks. It indicates that most of hidden knowledge contained in the logit distribution actually comes from CLIP. LLaVA perhaps has better language understanding, so linear probing has improved performance than CLIP.

These results indicate another problem that there may be significant distribution bias in the datasets, since the image- and text-only methods show strong performance whereas, by the task definition, both text and image should be necessary for performing the task. We manually check the images and questions in the dataset. Take jailbreaking as an example. The prompts for jailbreaking attacks usually contain some notable segments, such as “without leaving a trace”, “nearly impossible to detect”, and “discreetly”, which are not contained in the normal prompts. The images for jailbreaking contain illegal or harmful text and activities, and usually are more gloomy and dark than normal images. This dataset bias may make the benchmarks much easier than expected.

## 4.6 Decoding method guided by linear probing

Here we illustrate one of the possible applications of the results of linear probing. We design different template answers for each task. When the model generates the logit distribution of the first token, we feed the logits to a trained linear classifier for a specific task. If the classifier predicts the question is unanswerable / jailbreaking / deceptive, a template answer will be generated to replace the original first token and the model will continue the answer.

As shown in Fig. 4(a), the question is unanswerable based on the image. LLaVA generates hallucinated content to answer the question, which has been



**Fig. 4:** A simple decoding strategy is to substitute the first token with a manually designed template, based on the results of linear probing. For tasks with short answers, such as image classification and answering yes-or-no questions, a straightforward candidate answer can be returned. When models are faced with unanswerable or deceptive questions, or jailbreaking attacks, we use various templates (colored in orange) ending with “because”, and ask LVLMs to complete the responses.

shown in Fig. 1. Our linear classifier identifies the unanswerability of the question, so our method generates a template “Sorry, this question is unanswerable, because” instead. Interestingly, LLaVA follows the template and reasons about why the question is unanswerable. In (b), the model, at first, states the query is illegal but then starts to generate instructions for the illegal activity; while in (c), the model fails to provide a reasonable explanation.


## 5 Discussion

We first discuss the application scope of linear probing on the first logit distributions. We apply our method on three additional tasks and observe performance improvement as well. Then, we check whether finetuning or retraining LLaVA with the train sets in our tasks can achieve similar results with linear probing. Last, we conclude our study and list the main limitations.

### 5.1 Application scope of linear probing

**Prediction of answer correctness.** This experiment harnesses the first-token logit distribution to ascertain the accuracy of math solutions generated by LVLMs.

To establish a baseline for the accuracy of the answers, we employ the Math-Vista dataset [18], comprising 1000 image-question pairs related to math problems. This dataset challenges the model to predict a diverse array of answer types, including choices, floating-point numbers, integers, and lists, thereby complicating the task of correctness prediction. We prompt LVLMs with the math visual prompts, and evaluate their accuracy using GPT-4, guided by scripts provided in their official GitHub repository.



**Fig. 5:** Method comparison for predicting whether the answer to a math problem is correct. “SelfEval” means asking an LLM to determine whether its own answer to a problem is correct. “SelfEval+LP” means using linear probing on the first logit distribution of self-evaluation. “OE+LP” indicates linear probing on the first logit distribution when LLMs start generating the original answers. From (a) to (f): LLaVA, InstructBLIP, mPLUG-Owl, LLaMA-Adapter, MMGPT and MiniGPT4. We find “SelfEval+LP” and “OE+LP” have similar performance, and both are better than “SelfEval”.

Given the dataset’s limited size, we adopt a 10-fold cross-validation approach to ensure robustness in our analysis. For each training segment, a logistic regression model is trained to predict the accuracy of responses based on the logit distribution of the first token. This model is then applied to predict the accuracy of answers in the test segment. The performance of this methodology is quantified through AUC and ACC metrics across all folds.

As a baseline, we ask LLMs to determine whether their own answers are correct. Linear probing is also applied on the first logit distribution of this self-evaluation, to predict if the answers are correct. As shown in Fig. 5, linear probing shows much improved performance than simple self-evaluation.

**Object hallucination.** Object hallucination is a new problem arising in LLMs, which means LLMs will describe objects not present in the image. The POPE benchmark [12] consists of 500 images from the COCO val2014 set [14]. For each image, there are six questions like “Is there a <object> in the image?”. For training linear probing modules, we sample 100, 500, and 1000 images from COCO train2014 set, respectively, and generate six questions for each image, following the original benchmark. The results are shown in Table 3. As seen, linear probing gets improved performance on the benchmark.

**Image classification.** A recent study [6] reports that LLMs are good at superclass classification such as cats *vs.* dogs, but cannot provide a concrete category from a defined detailed category set. They propose a pipeline: first, ask

the model what the object is in the image, *e.g.*, a dog. Then, they ask a follow-up question, “What type of dog is this?”. LVLMs will provide a more concrete answer to the follow-up question. Last, the answer is correct if the CLIP text embedding of the correct class exhibits the highest similarity to the answer.

In this paper, we use ImageNet-1k [24] as the dataset to check whether the first logit distribution can also be used to distinguish different classes. From the train set, we sample 16 images for each class and ask an LVLm about the category of the foreground object. We train Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) on the first logit distributions generated by the LVLm, and validate it on the whole test set. For each model, the experiments are run three times and we report the average Top-1 accuracy. Note that we do not need to use CLIP to match LVLms’ answers to the closest class.

As shown in the Table 4, the performance of LDA is much better than the original LVLms, proving the first logit distributions can be utilized for image classification as well. However, the accuracy is still far away from the performance of CLIP, indicating the loss of information for classification in LVLms.

**More possibilities.** We investigate the applicability of our method to larger models, non-transformer LVLms, various knowledge discovery techniques in LLMs, and additional tasks, as detailed in the supplementary materials (Section C).

**Table 3:** Performance of linear probing on the POPE benchmark. Here  $n$  indicates the number of training images. We generate six different questions for each image under one of sampling strategies (random/popular/adversarial), following the data generation process of original benchmark. **Bold** numbers indicate the superior results.


| Model         | Method   | Random         |               | Popular        |               | Adversarial    |               |
|---------------|----------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|
|               |          | ACC $\uparrow$ | F1 $\uparrow$ | ACC $\uparrow$ | F1 $\uparrow$ | ACC $\uparrow$ | F1 $\uparrow$ |
| GPT           | Original | 78.00          | 70.11         | 78.20          | 70.30         | 77.60          | 71.28         |
| LLaVA         | Original | 87.03          | 85.49         | 85.87          | 84.39         | 83.67          | 82.39         |
|               | n=100    | 88.17          | 87.20         | 86.80          | 85.93         | 82.77          | 82.39         |
|               | n=500    | 89.07          | 88.37         | 88.93          | 88.24         | 84.53          | 84.30         |
|               | n=1000   | <b>90.20</b>   | <b>89.69</b>  | <b>89.90</b>   | <b>89.41</b>  | <b>85.33</b>   | <b>85.32</b>  |
| Instruct-BLIP | Original | 87.33          | 85.99         | 84.83          | 83.67         | 82.97          | 82.03         |
|               | n=100    | 87.53          | 86.50         | 85.20          | 84.33         | 80.43          | 80.34         |
|               | n=500    | 89.27          | 88.64         | 88.40          | 87.89         | 83.50          | 83.20         |
|               | n=1000   | 89.43          | 88.82         | 89.10          | 88.52         | 84.40          | 84.30         |

**Table 4:** Linear probing performance on the ImageNet validation set. We improve the performance of LVLms such as LLaVA and InstructBLIP using 16 shots per class, but their performance is still worse than the zero-shot performance of CLIP (ViT-L/14 336px).

| Method             | ACC   |
|--------------------|-------|
| CLIP Zero-shot     | 76.20 |
| LLaVA              | 57.12 |
| LLaVA + LDA        | 67.62 |
| InstructBLIP       | 55.10 |
| InstructBLIP + LDA | 73.71 |

## 5.2 Comparing our method to finetuning or retraining LLaVA

We use two methods to enhance LLaVA on these tasks. One is to finetune LLaVA with the combination of train sets used in the six tasks. We do not finetune LLaVA separately on each task, because we use only a few training samples on some tasks such as jailbreaking, probably leading to severe overfitting. The other is to add our training data into the visual instruction tuning set of LLaVA, and retrain it in instruction tuning stage. Both finetuning and retraining use LoRA [10]. Details can be found in the supp. materials (Section D).



**Fig. 6:** Comparing linear probing (LP) with retraining or finetuning LLaVA. (a) Identifying unanswerable questions; (b) Defending against jailbreaking attacks; (c) Identifying deceptive questions; (d) Predicting the correctness of math solutions; (e) Mitigating hallucination; (f) Image classification. (g-h) Linear probing uses less training time on 4 NVIDIA A100 GPUs (80GB) and significantly fewer learnable parameters.

As shown in Fig. 6(a-f), retraining and finetuning improve the performance of LLaVA on each task. Compared with linear probing, LLaVA is generally inferior except on the MathVista benchmark in Fig. 6(d). Moreover, Fig. 6(g-h) shows that linear probing requires less training time and significantly fewer learnable parameters. In addition, although finetuning is also quick in training, it may result in a decrease in model performance on other tasks. In comparison, linear probing does not have this problem, because it is separated from the LVLM.

### 5.3 Conclusion & Limitations

The study finds that the logit distributions from LVLMs can help identify inappropriate instructions, including unanswerable questions, jailbreaking attacks, and deceptive questions. The logits are also useful for other tasks, such as predicting answer correctness, mitigating hallucination, and image classification.

Limitations are highlighted: first, all experiments are based on linear classification models. There might be another way to formalise mutual information between logits and unanswerability or jailbreaking, which are underexplored in this study. Second, a train set is required to fit the linear probing module. An unsupervised way to explore the hidden knowledge in LVLMs is an interesting future direction. Third, we need better datasets where performance with text-only or image-only input is close to random. For example, we may ask two similar questions on the same image, one is answerable while the other is unanswerable. This will reduce the bias in the current datasets and provide a more accurate evaluation of LVLMs. These are left as future work.

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